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ON THE DUTIES AND RIGHTS OF PARENTS 
Carl E. Schneider* 
T HE law of the family is the law of the absurd. Law is a system of rules administered institutionally, and thus it must treat people cate-
gorically. When law regulates economic life, it finds people at arguably 
their most schematic, motivated-perhaps-by a relatively unitary con-
ception of their interest pursued in relatively rational ways. But in family 
life, people are at their least schematic and at their most frustratingly 
human, various, idiosyncratic, irrational, and perverse, and the law's 
efforts to affect them are thus often quixotic. In Parents as Fiduciaries, 1 
Professor Scott and Dean Scott strikingly and boldly deploy the concep-
tual vocabulary of the former kind of law to reinterpret the latter kind. 
The result-contrary to what one might expect given the awkwardness 
of the problem, but just as one might expect given the distinction of the 
authors-is an exceptionally engaging and provocative essay in the best 
tradition of legal scholarship. It is fair-minded, judicious, and sensible. It 
· is a sober and steadying contribution to a flighty and faddish field, yet it is 
creative. It is doctrinally based, informed, and perceptive, yet it is also a 
large survey of causes. And in its crucial aspects, it is animated by the 
most needed kind of moral insights. 
Indeed, so absorbing have I found this article that I have abandoned 
my original plan to go off on a frolic of my own and have instead devoted 
this Commentary to examining it in some depth and detail. In a way, 
though, I have found this enterprise difficult, since I agree with so much 
of what the Scotts have set out to do. I hope, then, that my remarks may 
be accepted as a friendly amendment, amplifying a bit here, raising some 
questions there, and finally speculating about what efforts like the Scotts' 
portend for legal scholarship. 
I take the Scotts' article to be a response to recent criticism of the law 
of parent and child. One branch of this criticism (which has recently been 
intensified in the press by cases like those of Jessica DeBoer) might be 
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan. Readers of some of my earlier articles may 
wonder at the archaic citation forms used in this Comment. Let me therefore say for the 
record that, for the reasons given in Richard A. Posner, Goodbye to the Bluebook, 53 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 1343 (1986), I followed the University of Chicago Manual of Legal Citation 
(1989) in writing this piece. 
1 Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 Va. L. Rev. 2401 
(1995). 
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called the child-advocate's critique. Simply put, the gist of this view is 
that the law advantages parents at the expense of their children. Another 
branch of this criticism has been particularly concerned with the conse-
quences of rights discourse for the law of parent and child specifically and 
for American social relations generally. This branch might be called the 
communitarian's critique. · 
The Scotts' response to this two-tined criticism is that the law of parent 
and child needs to be "reconceptualized" in terms of the fiduciary princi-
ple more familiar to us from the law of agency. The central mechanism 
of their article, then, is to take a concept from the law of agency and 
apply it to the law of the family. This mechanism, like any such borrow-
ing, raises a set of initial, basic questions: How is family law to understand 
the borrowed concept? Is that concept to be imported bodily as a rule? 
As a guiding principle? On this score, I am not entirely confident I 
understand the Scotts' proposal. They refer to the fiduciary idea vari-
ously as a "metaphor," an "analogy," and a "heuristic." These terms all 
appear to imply that the borrowed concept is not to be powerfully direc-
tive. But how directive then should it be, and how useful can it be if its 
teachings are not fairly emphatic? 
We may see the importance of that question more clearly when we con-
sider the next question the device of borrowing raises: To whom is the 
proposal made? Who is to receive and apply the new concept? Are we 
trying to affect, for instance, parental behavior, judicial actions, or schol-
arly thinking? Much of the article is (quite properly) concerned with how 
the public in general and parents in particular understand the concepts 
and language of the law. Thus the Scotts seek to discover the means 
through which a legal regulation can best motivate parents to invest the 
effort necessary to fulfill the obligations of child-rearing? Is the bor-
rowed doctrine, then, directed at that audience? Is it, in other words, 
intended to divert parents' attention away from the prerogatives of their 
rights toward the welfare of their children? 
This explanation seems unlikely, since one may doubt that the general 
public knows the· meaning of a term (fiduciary) even many law students 
ouly vaguely understand. Is the audience for the fiduciary proposal then 
the judiciary? Should courts expressly adopt, or at least implicitly con-
sult, the doctrine of fiduciary obligation? This is surely a more promising 
proposition, since judges presumably are well acquainted with that doc-
trine. On the other hand, the language the Scotts use to describe their 
proposal..:...._"metaphor," "analogy," "heuristic device"-does not evoke 
2 Id. at 2415-18. 
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the kind of concept that could be easily parsed and promulgated 
judicially. 
This kind of language does, however, seem aptly pitched for the aca-
demic ear. But whether the concept is intended for judges or scholars (or 
both), our next question will be the same: How much weight can the fidu-
ciary principle bear? How much guidance can it give us? 
The advantage of borrowing a concept from another area of law is the 
advantage of buying asparagus from the grocer instead of growing it 
yourself. Both the concept and the asparagus come ready to use; some-
one else has done all the work of developing the product. The danger in 
both cases is that the product may not be apt for your purposes. The 
asparagus might be fine for long boiling, but too old, tired, tough, and 
woody for the light steaming your more delicate dish demands. The con-
cept may be well-suited to its original home, but not to the new area of 
law. 
As the Scotts describe it, the law of fiduciary obligation is a protean 
doctrine which assumes different forms depending on the relationships 
involved. And none of the relationships to which it ordinarily applies 
much resembles the situation of parent and child. Indeed, the Scotts 
scrupulously chart a number of ways in which fiduciary and parent-child 
relationships differ significantly. For example, they note that a new fidu-
ciary can generally be substituted for an old one without intolerable dis-
ruption, while parents are not so readily replaced.3 The Scotts also 
suggest that it can be harder to gauge whether parents have acted in their 
child's interest than whether corporate directors have made a decision 
within the range of acceptable business practices.4 These and other dif-
ferences between the parent's situation and the fiduciary's raise the ques-
tion I posed at the beginning of this Commentary: whether commercial 
law is generally suited for an arena so different from family life as to 
make borrowing from it problematic for family law. 
Despite the differences between the situations of the fiduciary and the 
parent, fiduciary law might well have worked out concrete instantiations 
of its general principle, and the legal doctrines thus developed might well 
speak cogently to particular problems in family law. This is not, however, 
the direction the Scotts go. They rarely mention specific rules of fiduciary 
law. And in the main exception to this generalization-their discussion 
of the prohibition on self-dealing-the Scotts convincingly show why 
fiduciary law cannot readily be applied to family law.5 Thus it seems that, 
3 Id. at 2428, 2430. 
4 Id. at 2437-41. 
5 ld. 
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as developed legal doctrine, fiduciary law does not brightly illuminate 
many of the dark dilemmas of family law. 
Perhaps, then, the benefit of recruiting fiduciary law into family law is 
that the former incorporates general principles the latter lacks but needs. 
This does seem to be much closer to what the Scotts have in mind. They 
argue that fiduciary law distinguishes itself among legal fields as instinct 
with a sense of moral obligation and that introducing fiduciary law into 
family law would therefore promote a sense of moral obligation to 
greater prominence in the eyes of courts and parents. 
I confess that my interest in this line of reasoning grows out of an arti-
cle I wrote a decade ago in which I argued that the law·has decreasingly 
discussed family issues in moral terms.6 The Scotts' article appears to be 
part of what may be a trend which bespeaks some unease about that ten-
dency. This trend-if such it be-comprises just the strange bedfellows 
politics is said to make, for to it contribute, in their various ways, femi-
nists and conservatives, scholars and politicians, the press and the public. 
That trend has perhaps been most apparent in discussions of child sup-
port. But, as the works the Scotts cite suggest,7 its scope is altogether 
broader. While the ultimate nature, strength, and permanence of this 
movement are yet uncertain, I believe it has sparked a rewarding exami-
nation of the tendency away from moral discourse in family law. 
Nevertheless, I wonder whether fiduciary principles may not be prob-
lematic as a general statement of what parents should do for their chil-
dren. In its original, pure form, the fiduciary principle appears to require 
fiduciaries to put their loyalty to the benefited person's interest above all 
else. A& the famous (and inevitable) passage from Cardozo puts it, 
"Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity when 
petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty .... "8 But the 
interests of children probably should not invariably trump the interests of 
parents. The Scotts acknowledge this, and remind us that we do not 
expect parents always to sacrifice themselves to serve their children.9 
Courts acknowledge this-too when, for example, they make a custodian's 
wealth irrelevant in child-custody proceedings. Other things being equal 
(and probably even if some things aren't equal),- most children would 
6 Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discpurse and the Transfonnation of American Family Law, 
83 Mich. L. Rev. 1803 (1985). I continued my exploration of this theme in Rethinking 
Alimony: Marital Decisions and Moral Discourse, 1991 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 197; The 
Channelling Function in Family Law, 20 Hofstra L. Rev. 495 (1992); and Marriage, Morals, 
and the Law: No-Fault Divorce and Moral Discourse, 1994 Utah L. Rev. 503. 
7 Scott & Scott, supra note 1, at 2413 n.44. 
s Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). 
9 Scott & Scott, supra note 1, at 2413-14, 2432, 2432. 
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probably prefer to live in a well-to-do household than a poor one. In a 
capitalist society, this is sensible enough. As John Rawls reminds us, 
money is a primary good, something "it is supposed a rational man wants 
whatever else he wants .... With more of these goods men can generally 
be assured of greater success in carrying out their intentions and in 
advancing their ends, whatever these ends may be."10 We exclude this 
otherwise relevant consideration, I suppose, out of an unarticulated sense 
of fairness to the adults who are candidates for custody. But exclude it 
we do. 
In short, in one sense the fiduciary standard seems higher than the 
standard we might expect from parents. This is because the fiduciary's 
relationship with the benefitted party is commonly of limited scope, while 
the relationship between parent and child involves broad swaths of both 
of their lives. It may be practical to impose a high standard of selflessness 
within a limited strip of a person's life; it is less practical to do so more 
globally. 
The Scotts are well aware of this kind of problem with applying the 
fiduciary standard to parents. And they also understand that the state's 
limited enforcement powers and the family's need for privacy tightly con-
strict what the law can demand of parents.11 But by the time the Scotts 
have taken all these limitations into account, the standard the fiduciary 
principle demands of parents seems rather modest. In short, there winds 
up being so little moral meat left in the stew that it begins to look almost 
vegetarian. 
This problem becomes clearer when we look at what the law (and, as I 
understand them, the Scotts) actually ask of parents. Essentially, the law 
only intervenes in an intact family when parents have drastically 
affronted the most modest kinds of standards, when they have abused or 
neglected their children. Even parents who have abused or neglected 
their children are basically held only to the law's minimal standards of 
parental decency. And when the law deals with divorced parents, it effec-
tively asks little more than that they pay what they owe. The law would 
deny unmarried fathers parental standing only when they have in some 
useful sense abandoned their children. In child-custody disputes, parents 
are not judged by any objective standard, but are only compared with 
each other. In all these cases, the fiduciary principle in its aspirational 
form is irrelevantly high, and in its applied form incongruously low. 
I say "incongruously low" because the gravamen of the fiduciary prin-
ciple is presumably to inspire an elevated standard of moral conduct in 
to John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 92 (1971). 
u Scott & Scott, supra note 1, at 2430-31. 
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parents: "By establishing a standard of performance that emphasizes 
heightened obligations of loyalty and integrity, and by the use of horta-
tory moral rhetoric, the law invokes a personal sense o(moral obligation 
in the performance of fiduciary duty."12 But the fiduciary principle as 
applied to parents is much, much weaker than the standard of moral 
behavior socially applied to parents. In American culture, a mother or a 
father's obligation to a child is potentially greater than virtually any other 
kind of obligation one person can pledge to another. The fiduciary obli-
gation, so often essentially commercial, is of a weaker sort. The fiduciary 
standard is "loyalty and reasonable diligence."13 The parental standard is 
altruism. 
In sum, it is hard to get concrete and convincing guidance about what 
the fiduciary principle means for family law from the general moral prin-
ciple it is usually taken to embody. Thus we are relegated to a hypotheti-
cal bargain the .Scotts posit as the source of our understanding of that 
meaning. How far can such a bargain take us? 
The device of the hypothetical bargain has an illustrious history in both 
law and philosophy. That history teaches that the usefulness of the device 
depends on how richly and accurately the original position of the parties 
is gauged. Professor Scott has set a high standard for using this kind of 
device in her influential article Rational Decisionmaking About Marriage 
and Divorce .14 There she suggested that couples contemplating marriage 
might wish to bind themselves to each other more firmly by using 
"precommitments." However, the bargaining that might lead to such 
precommitments was in a sense real bargaining involving people in quite 
a specific and realistic situation. Professor Scott was able to make their 
situation yet more specific and realistic by adducing the relevant social 
science literatures about couples' preferences. 
In contrast, the bargain envisioned here is e.ntirely and genuinely hypo-
thetical. It involves an almost undifferentiated mass of people in a quite 
imaginary negotiation. Thus assigning the parties powers, interests, and 
arguments becomes an awkward task. Consider, for example, the bar-
gaining power assigned the state. In the paper they presented at the con-
ference, the Scotts stated in explicit terms the assumption which survives . 
in the current version: that "rearing children in a family unit is subject to 
state approval."15 This is rather daring. It conflicts with our feeling that 
12 Id. at 2425. 
13 Id. at 2402. 
14 Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce, 76 Va. L. 
Rev. 9 (1990). 
15 Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, Paper Presented at the 
John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics and VIrginia Law Review Conference on 
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the family is in important senses prior to the state. It also conflicts with 
the reality that the state cannot effectively prevent people from raising 
their own children (because it lacks the resources and skill to raise them 
itself). 
Nor is it clear that the Scotts' assumptions about the interests of the 
parties are completely described. We are told that "the overarching pur-
pose of the state is to protect the interests of children in receiving from 
their parents the care and nurture necessary to enable them to develop 
into healthy adults."16 But doesn't the state have other interests? What 
about the cost of that project? And doesn't the state have an interest in 
promoting even the parents' interests? 
We may ask similar questions of the motive assigned to the parents, 
which is "to maximize the returns from parenthood.'m Might the parents 
not want to minimize the burdens of parenthood? Might the parents 
want to be able to slip the bonds of parenthood where the costs seemed 
to exceed the benefits? Might they simply want to maximize their happi-
ness, of which the returns of parenthood would only be one part? Many 
parents might simply want to be left alone. Such parents might have 
views-for instance, opinions about disciplining children-that would 
violate even the minimalist rules the law presently embodies. Other par-
ents would value their privacy intensely. In short, what prospective par-
ents would really say would greatly depend on their own understanding 
of their own situation, and such understandings would differ a good deal. 
The Scotts obviously know how much parents differ. Why do they not 
take those differences more fully into account? We may get a hint from 
their occasional use of the term "precommitments.'' What the Scotts do 
not say in terms but seem to be arguing is that parents might recognize 
that the ideals with which they enter parenthood can be lost in the shuf-
fle, and that therefore parents might want the state to hold them to those 
ideals. But would parents really think this way? For example, parents 
with heterodox religious views might regard the chances of falling short 
of their ideals as rather low, and the dangers of state intervention as 
rather great, and thus prefer no intervention. Other parents might prefer 
other kinds of precommitment devices in which the state did not play 
such a regulatory role. 
"New Directions in Family Law" 39 (March 3-4, 1995) (on file with the Virginia Law 
Review Association). This implicit premise survives in the final Article, as the Scotts 
presume that ·'in rearing children parents must fulfill the fundamental objective of the 
state: to provide the care and nurture necessary for children to develop as healthy, 
functioning adults." Scott & Scott, supra note 1, at 2432. 
16 Id. at 2431. 
17 Id. at 2432. 
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' 
To rescue the hypothetical bargain from the many ways differently situ-
ated parents could conceive of their interests, we might say that we are 
assuming purely hypothetical parents, so that they are blinded by the veil 
of ignorance Jolm Rawls imagines. But this raises exactly the kinds of 
problems traditionally directed at Rawl~' version of the hypothetical bar-
gain. These problems are intensified by the fact that we are not imagin-
ing an entire society de novo, but rather trying to decide how to regulate 
real families in a present society with a long history. Further, I am 
inclined to think that, once the bargainers become so abstracted from real 
people in real situations, it is possible to imagine them taking many posi-
tions, all reasonable, but not all identical. To get them to agree, if you 
could do so at all, you would have to formulate your principles so broadly 
and vaguely that they would offer little guidance. In short, can the hypo-
thetical bargain be determinate enough to provide useful guidance? 
Furthermore, something may be lost by not confronting the problem of 
social regulation more directly. The hypothetical bargaining device 
seems, for instance, to assume that the state and parents agree enough 
about essentials to reach agreement on them. This may be true, but I am 
skeptical. I wonder whether it might be franker and more realistic to say 
that the state imposes rules in order to prevent parents from harming 
their children, not because they and the state have reached some kind of 
hypothetical contract. The state presumably would argue, as the Scotts 
do, that its rules are right and that parents therefore should want them. 
But the rules were adopted because they were right, and not because the 
parties would have agreed to them. 
I have asked what kind of guidance the fiduciary prinCiple can give 
family law. I have examined each source of guidance that principle might 
offer, and I have raised the possibility that each is in important ways mute 
or garbled. Ultimately, then, Parents as Fiduciaries may be not so much a 
demonstration that the fiduciary principle should be borrowed for family 
law, but an argument that the parents' rights principle has come to be 
misunderstood and that properly understood it incorporates a concern for 
children's welfare. As the Scotts write, "The central insight of the fiduci-
ary heuristic is to focus attention on the reciprocal relationship between 
· parental rights and children's interests."18 
I quite agree with the Scotts that the parental-rights doctrine may be 
conceived of as a rule intended to serve children's interests. And I 
believe the Scotts perform an estimable service in reminding us of this 
fundamental assumption. Parents' rights have commonly been assumed 
to protect children exactly becau~e people have thought that, as a rule, 
18 Id. at 2474. 
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parents and children have a community of interest and that parents thus 
have a duty and ability to speak for their children, children who are pre-
sumptively unable _to speak for themselves. 
These assumptions find a variety of expressions. In our family law 
casebook, for instance, Margaret Brinig and I suggest eight justifications 
for assigning parents rights.19 First, parents ordinarily know their child 
and their child's situation better than anyone else can, since they have 
cared for and lived with their child in the most complete kind of way from 
its birth, and since no governmental agency is well situated to acquire 
equally good information. Second, decisions about children implicate 
questions about the dynamics of child development and of family interac-
tions about which many judges and }?ureaucrats are not particularly 
expert. (Parents may be no more expert, but at least the state will often 
be unable to assert superior insight to override the parents' judgment.) 
Third, the situations in which children live are so various, complex, and 
unpredictable that no adequately comprehensive, detailed, and principled 
set of standards could be drawn up that would satisfactorily guide courts 
or agencies in making decisions about children. Furthermore, in a large 
pluralistic society it is hard to reach a satisfactory social agreement about 
what kind of adults we want children to become, about what child-rearing 
methods will produce what kind of adults, or about what child-rearing 
methods are otherwise appropriate. And yet further, some kinds of con-
siderations-like religious belief or ethnic tradition-may be desirable in 
rearing children but illegitimate for the state to employ. Fmally, at least 
some decisions about children ought not obey the impersonal standards 
the law must use, but should heed the standards of accommodation, affec-
tion, and love which parents commonly feel for their children. 
The fourth justification for parental rights has to do with the enforce-
ment problem. Much of the interaction between parents and children 
occurs in private, and government therefore cannot easily find out about 
it or supervise it. Much that influences parents involves psychological 
motives which are both strong and ill perceived and which thus are so 
imperative that even governmental sanctions may be vain. Furthermore, 
parents will often feel that their upbringing of their children is not the 
concern of outsiders (and particularly not any of the government's busi-
ness), so that parents will resist attempts to enforce government's rules 
and decisions. And finally, governmental attempts to enforce rules or 
decisions against parents may provoke them to retaliate against the very 
people the government is trying to protect-the children. 
19 Carl E. Schneider & Margaret F. Brinig, An Invitation to Family Law (1996). We 
discuss these questions in Chapter 8. 
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Fifth, governmental intervention, by bringing into the family outsiders 
from social workers to prosecutors,, may disrupt the stability of the rela-
tionship between parent and child. As Goldstein, Freud and Solnit, for 
example, put the point, one justification for parental rights is that chil-
dren need stable authority figures and that governmental intervention in 
the family injures parents in that role.20 Sixth, and relatedly, state inquiry 
into the world of parent and child may injure parents and children by 
diminishing the privacy of both in ways that do genuine harm. 
Notably, these first six rationales for parental rights are based on the 
belief that giving parents power is good for children. These rationales are 
pragmatic and prudential. They are essentially generalizations which rea-
son that the state will ordinarily raise children less successfully than par-
ents and so should presumptively be excluded from doing so. 
These six prudential justifications do not, however, exhaust our list of 
reasons to attribute rights to parents. While the six say little about the 
interests of parents, the seventh draws on the principle that it is norma-
tively preferable for people to organize their own lives, particularly their 
own intimate lives. Thus our seventh justification for parental rights is 
that parents should be able to organize their relationship with their chil-
dren. This justification might be inadequate by itself, and it should be 
read in conjunction with the other justifications. Nevertheless, it does 
look at parents' interests in their relationship with their children, and thus 
I believe captures an integral part of American thinking about this sub-
ject perhaps more directly than the Scotts seem to allow. 
But the children's interests and the parents' interests do not exhaust 
our justifications for parental rights. Our eighth justification h~s ,to do 
with what might be considered the state's interests: Allowing parents 
freedom to raise their children as they prefer allows parents to perpetuate 
whatever communities, orthodox or heterodox, the parents prefer, 
thereby helping to preserve the range of communities necessary to make 
pluralism meaningful. Pluralism as Americans have commouly under-
stood it depends on the persistence of cultural communities, and that per-
sistence is most likely where parents may- raise children in a cultural 
heritage. If the state would pro~ote a pluralist society, it can usefully 
recognize parents' rights. Thus like the seventh argument for parents 
rights, the eighth extends beyond the state's interest in seeing children 
well reared. 
As I said at the beginning of this piece, the present wave of family law 
reform holds' that ~arents' interests have been exalted over children's. 
20 See Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud & Albert J. Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of 
the Child 7 (1973). 
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Ironically, the preceding wave used the kind of reasoning the Scotts and 
Brinig and I instantiate to argue that parents' rights may serve children's 
welfare. In two influential articles, for instance, Michael Wald advocated 
stricter adherence to parental rights.Z1 He contended that the state was 
too willing to separate children from their parents and to place them in 
unsatisfactory foster homes, and he wanted to temper that willinguess 
through a strategy of parents' rights. 
If the parents' rights principle is substantially based on the child's inter-
ests, as the Scotts and I contend, why is it presently criticized as inimical 
to children's interests? Let me suggest two among the several possible 
causes. The first has to do with the nature of American rights discourse. 
As the Scotts note, the rhetoric of rights has a force of its own both in 
legal and popular culture, a force which can drive parents, officials, and 
judges to an enthusiasm for parents' rights that quite outstrips the ration-
ale for them. In addition, our rights language sadly lacks an adequate 
vocabulary for expressing countervailing interests. In technical terms, 
constitutional rights-analysis has generally scanted the state interests that 
may conflict with the parent's right.22 Thus the prudential origins of 
parental rights are all too easily forgotten. To put the point somewhat 
differently, parents' rights can be so unyielding that the only thing power-
ful enough to blast them loose is a countervailing right, like children's 
rights. 
A second cause of the present discontent has to do, I think, with the 
fact that any legal regime governing the relations of parent and child will 
inevitably produce some deplorable cases. Any such regime must rely on 
some combination of rules and discretion, and both rules and discretion 
regularly fail. Discretion may be abused, and the people to whom discre-
tion is confided will sometimes err. Rules are a kind of generalization, 
and all generalizations are false. Error is thus inevitable. Unhappily, we 
too easily respond to error by assuming that our grant of discretion was 
improvident or that our rule is unwise. Our rule has been parents' rights, 
and it has produced its errors. We now seek to prevent such errors from 
arising in the future by instituting a new rule-children's rights. Yet this 
21 Michael Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: A Search for 
Realistic Standards, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 985 (1975); Michael S. Wald, State Intervention on 
Behalf of "Neglected" Children: Standards for Removal of Children from Their Homes, 
Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care, and Termination of Parental Rights, 28 
Stan. L. Rev. 623 (1976). 
22 I develop this argument at some length in State-Interest Analysis in Fourteenth 
Amendment "Privacy" Law: An Essay on the Constitutionalization of Social Issues, Law & 
Contemp. Probs., Winter 1988, at 79. 
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rule will ineluctably cause errors (possibly more numerous and more dis-
tressing) of its own. 
Ultimately, I doubt there really is much disagreement about the broad 
goal of legal policy regarding children. At base, rather, there is a consen-
sus about the centrality of children's well-being, at least within the rather 
narrow ambit of the law's capacity. The question is just how you reach 
that goal. I am not even sure how much genuine difference there is 
among the controversialists. Indeed, as I have been implying, the pre-
sumably conflicting tests tend to collapse into each other. The Scotts, for 
instance, say that the law should focus "principally on the relationship 
between parent and child, rather than on the child's needs per se."23 But 
an important part of what the child needs is a good relationship with its 
parents, and that relationship partly depends on the child's needs being 
met Parents' rights take children's claims into account. Children's inter-
ests depend on good relations with their parents. 
The Scotts recognize ..how interrelated the contending rules are. 
Indeed, their article could be taken as an effort to show how readily those 
rules can be reconciled. However, the Scotts continue to feel that the 
choice among the rules matters.24 And this brings me to my last point. 
As I have argued, the debate to which the Scotts have so ably contributed 
is largely about what rule we need to write to produce good results. I 
have suggested that there is rough social agreement about what a good 
result is. There is, however, real disagreement about how to produce it. 
To resolve that disagreement, we need to ask the right questions: How do 
courts and agencies interpret the various possible rules? How would the 
rules thus interpreted actually affect the behavior of courts and of agen-
cies? And what effect would that behavior have on the short- and long-
term well-being of children and their parents? 
These crucial questions cannot be answered by doctrinal analysis, how-
ever acute, nor by theoretical argument, however keen. They are ques-
tions that demand empirical investigation. To be sure, such empirical 
work must be informed by other kinds of scholarship. To be sure, such 
empirical work will rely on normative assumptions and have normative 
consequences. But everything depends on that empirical work. 
I am on record in favor of scholarship that undertakes the labor of 
definition, generalization, and theory in family law.25 Family law has 
moved markedly in that direction in the decade since I wrote that article 
23 Scott & Scott, supra note 1, at 2415. 
24 Id. at 2416-18. 
-25 Carl E. Schneider, The Next Step: Definition, Generalization, and Theory in 
American Family Law, 18 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 1039 (1985). 
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(although not, I am sure, because of it). My own work in family law has 
irredeemably been in that vein. I continue to think theoretical work 
essential to legal scholarship. But I am increasingly inclined to believe 
that such work is idle without an extensive empirical foundation and 
without exhaustive empirical monitoring. 
Nevertheless, family law scholars have not, I think, been eager to do 
that kind of work.26 This is understandable. Empirical research can be 
difficult. It is often time-consuming. At its most satisfying, it may .be 
prohibitively expensive. It can require skills lawyers may lack. It is not 
always properly rewarded: Law review students commonly underesti-
mate its importance; faculty sadly and foolishly tend to regard only theo-
retical work as worthy of a great mind. In my darker moments, I see a 
danger that theory may drive out empiricism, that family law scholarship 
may skip from the doctrinal to the doctrinaire without ever pausing for 
the empirical. 
Yet the case for such work almost makes itself. In brief: "It is no doubt 
true that you caunot get from is to ought. But you ought to know what is 
is before you say what ought ought to be."27 We need empiricism to ward 
off hyper-rationalism. "Hyper-rationalism is essentially the substitution 
of reason for information and analysis. It. has two components: first, the 
belief that reason can reliably be used to infer facts where evidence is 
unavailable or incomplete, and second, the practice of interpreting facts 
through a [narrow] set of artificial analytic categories."28 Hyper-rational-
ism thus "tempts us to believe that we can understand how people think 
and act merely by reasoning, and not by investigating. Hyper-rationalism 
seductively justifies discussing human behavior without doing the empiri-
cal work necessary to discover how people actually behave. Hyper-
rationalism is the conceptualist's revenge for the world's complexity."29 
The legally trained mind seems specially susceptible to hyper-rational-
ism. The case method intrudes empirical reality only anecdotally; rights 
thinking prefers the lofty heights of ratiocination. But when legal schol-
arship has ventured to ask empirically whether law works as it is intended 
to, and even whether it has much effect at all, the answers have hardly 
been reassuring. Stewart Macaulay reports that businesses widely do not 
26 I must stress that I am not exempting myself from these criticisms. If anything, I have 
exacerbated the problem by incitement and example. My only plea in mitigation can be 
that I am now doing empirical work in the field of Jaw and medicine. And I have found it 
valuable (and absorbingly interesting). 
27 Carl E. Schneider, Bioethics with a Human Face, 69 Ind. L.J. 1075, 1077 (1994). 
28 Carl E. Schneider, Lawyers and Children: WISdom and Legitimacy in Family Policy, 
84 Mich. L. Rev. 919, 932 (1986). 
29 Schneider, supra note 27, at 1078. 
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think of themselves as using contracts and avoid settling disputes contrac-
tually.30 Robert Ellickson finds that the ranchers and farmers of Shasta 
County, California, do not know the rules of liability for damage done by 
wandering cattle, and do not much care.31 Despite the Patient Self-
Determination Act and much state legislation, "[n]o more than 10 per-
cent of the population has either a living will or a durable power of attor-
ney."32 I could go on at some length. 
When good empirical work has been done in family law, it has been 
revealing and even confounding. Among the generation of family law 
scholars most prominent when I entered the field, for example, there are 
several who have done crucial empirical work (as well as noteworthy the-
oretical work). Robert Mnookin, for example, discovered in his empirical 
work that not an his theoretical speculations about divorce negotiations 
were fully borne- out.33 David Chambers perhaps found that jail, 
whatever its other disadvantages, was a more effective tool for collecting 
child support than he might originally have supposed.34 The co~tributors 
to In, the Interest of Children35 learned that people avail themselves of 
due process mechanisms a good deal less than courts and scholars com-
fortably contemplate.36 
More particularly, Michael Wald, a principal proponent of stronger 
parents' rights in abuse-and-neglect law, examined that law's actual 
effects. 37 His work raised the possibility that the rules of law we have 
been considering may matter less than one might suppose a priori. He 
concluded that, considering only "what happened to the children from 
the time we first saw them until the end of the study, two years later, 
there was not a great deal of difference between home and foster care."38 
In short, such research establishes that the legal prhlciples the Scotts, and 
30 Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 
Am. Soc. Rev. 55 (1963). 
31 Robert C. Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (1991). 
32 Arthur L. Caplan, Can Autonomy be Saved?, in If I Were a Rich Man Could I Buy a 
Pancreas? and Other Essays on the Ethics of Health Care 256, 261 (1992). 
33 Eleanor E. Maccoby & Robert H. Mnookin, Dividing the Child: Social and Legal 
Dilemmas of Custody (1992). 
34 David L. Chambers, Making Fathers Pay: The Enforcement of Child Support (1979). 
35 Robert H. Mnookin, Robert A Burt, David L. Chambers, Michael S. Wald, Stephen 
D. Sugarman, Franklin E. Zimring & Rayman L. Solomon, In the Interest of Children: 
Advocacy, Law Reform, and Public Policy (1985). 
36 Id. For an amplification of my point about this study, see my review of it: Carl E. 
Schneider, Lawyers and Children: Wisdom and Legitimacy in Family Policy, 84 Mich. L. 
Rev. 919 (1986). 
37 Michael S. Wald, J.M. Carlsmith & P.H. Leiderman, Protecting Abused and 
Neglected Children (1988). 
38 Id. at 183. 
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I, and others have considered at such length may not lead to consequent-
ial changes in outcomes. 
In sum, Parents as Fiduciaries is an admirable work of legal scholarship. 
But it is not part of the genre of work I have come to believe is most 
likely to contribute to real progress in our understanding of the kinds of 
issues it raises. It is exactly because this article is so fine that this Com-
ment is a suitable vehicle for what I want to say about legal scholarship. 
If even so skillful, thoughtful, and wise a piece cannot be expected, and 
indeed does not intend, to penetrate to the key questions we need to ask 
about how the law in this area works, then we need to consider how to 
change the agenda of family law scholarship.39 
39 I am also emboldened to make my perhaps impertinent suggestions about empirical 
work in the context of commenting on the Scotts' article because Professor Scott is herself 
distinguished for bringing empirical learning to bear on family law. See, e.g., Elizabeth 
Scott & Andre Derdeyn, Rethinking Joint Custody, 45 Ohio St. L.J. 455 (1984); Scott, 
supra note 14; Elizabeth S. Scott, Judgment and Reasoning in Adolescent Decisionmaking, 
37 Viii. L. Rev. 1607 (1992). 
